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Ecosystem Services and the Value of Places 
 
In the US Environmental Protection Agency, the World Wide Fund for Nature and many 
other environmental organisations, it is standard practice to evaluate particular woods, 
wetlands and other such places on the basis of the ‘ecosystem services’ they are thought to 
provide. I argue that this practice cannot account for one important way in which places are of 
value to human beings. When they play integral roles in our lives, particular places have a 
kind of value which cannot be adequately conceived in terms of service provision. Since it is 
in this respect limited, the ecosystem services framework can, I suggest, be criticised on 
grounds of justice. 
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Suppose that government administrators are trying to decide whether to allow a certain forest to be 
felled in order to make room for a housing development. Amongst other things, they will need to 
know what sorts of value the forest has and how much of each sort of value it has. They will need, 
where appropriate, to see the relevant values expressed as prices. And they will need to consider 
whether the loss of value could be offset by, say, the restoration of some other forest. 
Nowadays, such assessments are typically carried out using a particular conceptual 
framework. The UN Environment Programme, the US Government’s Environmental Protection 
Agency, the World Wide Fund for Nature, Friends of the Earth, the UK Government’s Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs—in these and other environmental organisations, the ecosystem 
services framework (ESF) is standardly employed to assess the value of particular places. If the value 
of a forest, wetland, heath, prairie, shoreline, reef, meadow, mudflat or mountain valley has been 
assessed by an environmental agency, then, chances are, it has been assessed by means of the ESF.
1
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 Like those who adopt the ESF, I focus on places that are natural, in the sense that their current states 
are not substantially the intended products of human action. Yet that choice should not be taken to 
indicate a commitment to some fundamental ontological distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘non-
natural’ places. My argument presupposes no such distinction. 
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Granted, place is not synonymous with ecosystem, and it will in many cases be unclear 
whether a certain place is an ecosystem in its own right, rather than part of a larger ecosystem or a 
collection of smaller ones, or something of an entirely different ontological order. Nonetheless, 
whether or not they think that whatever place they are considering is itself an ecosystem, those who 
adopt the ESF will assess its value on the basis of the contribution it makes to the provision of 
ecosystem services. According to the ESF, then, the aforementioned forest might be deemed to be of 
value because, amongst other things, it plays a role in the cycling of nutrients (a supporting ecosystem 
service), supplies timber (a provisioning ecosystem service) and absorbs atmospheric carbon dioxide 
(a regulating ecosystem service). It might also be thought to contribute to the supply of certain 
cultural ecosystem services, by inspiring local artists, for instance, or by serving as a woodland burial 
site. 
In the following, I argue that the ESF cannot provide an adequate account of one important 
way in which particular places can benefit, and so be of value to, human beings. I propose that when 
they play integral roles in our lives, particular places have a kind of value which cannot be adequately 
conceived in terms of the provision of ecosystem services. If it works, my argument shows that the 
ESF can provide only a very limited account of the value of places. Moreover, it indicates that using 
that conceptual framework can result in the further marginalisation of social groups which are in 
various respects already marginalised. It follows, I conclude, that the use of the ESF can be criticised 
on grounds of justice. 
The paper is structured as follows. I begin by considering a line of reasoning which seems to 
suggest that the ESF can provide a satisfactory account of all the ways that places can benefit, and so 
be of value to, human beings. In sections 1 and 2, I discuss the argument that since it is not possible to 
have any direct moral duties to them, particular places can be of only instrumental or ‘service’ value, 
if they are of any value at all. In Section 3, I show that that argument has a false premise. In Section 4, 
I consider William J. Fitzpatrick’s argument that certain places have non-instrumental value because 
they play constitutive roles in human flourishing. Although that argument fails to convince, 
Fitzpatrick is, I suggest, right to note that something to which it is not possible to have any direct 
moral duties can have non-instrumental value when it is part of a valuable whole. Drawing on some 
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examples from literature and anthropology, I use Section 5 to argue that particular places can have 
this sort of non-instrumental value when they are (in a sense I explain) integral to a person’s life. In 
sections 6, 7 and 8, I argue that such constitutive values cannot be adequately conceived in terms of 
the ESF, and that, in this respect, that framework is severely limited, even when judged by the lights 
of its own, anthropocentric standards. 
 
1 Duties to Places? 
 
In On Moral Considerability, Mark H. Bernstein does not discuss ecosystem services. However, he 
does have some interesting things to say about the relations between duty and value – and, as will 
become clear, what he has to say on these matters is relevant to our discussion of the ESF.  
Near the beginning of his book, Bernstein distinguishes between those entities which qualify 
as moral patients and those which do not. An entity falls into the former category, he maintains, if and 
only if it is possible to have one or more direct moral duties to it.
2
 These claims are uncontroversial; 
yet, having made them, Bernstein moves on to make a contentious statement about the sort of value 
that can be had by entities that do not qualify as moral patients: ‘The only value that they have is 
instrumental, value in the service of other individuals who themselves have value.’ (Bernstein 1998, 
p. 117) 
 Not all those entities that fail to qualify as moral patients will be of instrumental value: some 
will have no value at all. So I suspect that Bernstein meant to say that if an entity is not a moral 
patient, then it can be of only instrumental value, if it is of any value at all. But if that conditional 
statement is true, and if, moreover, no particular places qualify as moral patients, then it follows that 
particular places can be of only instrumental value, if they are of any value at all. Formally: 
 
1. If it is not possible to have any direct moral duties to x, then x can be of only instrumental 
value, if it is of any value at all 
                                                 
2
 Bernstein 1998, Chapter 1, especially p. 14. Bernstein refers to ‘obligations’ rather than ‘duties’. In 
this context, however, the difference is irrelevant. 
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2. It is not possible to have any direct moral duties to any particular places 
Therefore, any particular place can be of only instrumental value, if it is of any value at all 
 
If sound, this argument goes some way towards justifying the use of the ESF. For if particular places 
really can be of only instrumental or ‘service’ value, if they are of any value at all, then the ESF is, 
presumably, able to provide a satisfactory account of whatever value they have.
3
  
But is the argument sound? Begin by considering Premise 2. Writers such as Eric Katz (1997, 
p. 158), Tom Sorell (2000, p. 162) and Mary Midgley (1983, p. 179) hold that it is possible to have 
direct moral duties to some places (Katz cites ‘the rain forest’, Sorell ‘forests and islands’ and 
Midgley ‘islands’). These claims are, however, very questionable. Consider what an entity must be 
like if it is possible to have any direct moral duties to it. On this issue, opinions differ; however, 
according to one very plausible view, it is only possible to have such duties to an entity if the entity in 
question has a good of its own. To say that an entity has a good, in this context, is to say that it is 
capable of being either benefited or harmed. If, moreover, it has a good of its own, then it must be 
possible to make sense of its being either benefited or harmed without referring to the desires, 
interests or goods of any other entity. Consider the example of James Bond’s liver. James can 
certainly harm his liver, by, for instance, drinking lots of Martinis, and in this respect his liver differs 
from those sorts of entities, such as pencils and bicycles, which can be damaged but not harmed. Even 
so, to say that drinking lots of Martinis is bad for James’s liver is only a roundabout way of saying 
that quaffing Martinis is bad for James. Although his liver has a good, it does not have a good of its 
own. That distinction belongs to James (or at least, would belong to him, were he a real person), but to 
none of his organs. 
 In this respect, James Bond is more like a plant than either a liver or a bicycle. A spider plant, 
for example, can be benefited or harmed. To pot it in treacle or sprinkle it with concentrated sulphuric 
acid is to harm it. However, unlike the case of the liver or that of the bicycle, the spider plant’s good 
does not depend on the desires, interests or goods of any other entity. In order to explain what it 
                                                 
3
 No doubt places have instrumental value for some nonhuman beings. In what follows, however, I 
focus on their value for human beings. 
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means for a spider plant to be benefited or harmed, one need refer only to the sorts of entities spider 
plants are. The interests, desires or goods of us humans, or of anything else for that matter, are beside 
the point (see further, Sandler 2007, p.77). 
Now consider particular places. The first set of questions one faces in trying to assess whether 
one could have duties to them are ontological and epistemological, rather than moral. If one is to be 
able to discharge duties to a particular place, then one must be able to distinguish it from other places. 
In many cases, however, this is likely to prove difficult. For instance, it may well be unclear whether a 
particular area of heath counts as a particular place, a collection of places or merely part of some 
larger place. Turning from the dimension of space to that of time, it might also be unclear whether, if 
the heath reverts to woodland, one is dealing with a change in a single place or the replacement of one 
place with another. And then, of course, there is the question of subjectivity. Must a place be a place 
for a subject? Does the heath qualify as a place if it is a place for no one – neither any human being 
nor any other sort of subject (see further, Casey 1997)? 
Fortunately, there is no need to answer these difficult questions here, for one needs only a 
vague sense of what a place is to see that they are not the sorts of ‘things’ to which it is possible to 
have direct moral duties. To be sure, a human being or a dog could perhaps count as a place for a flea, 
say, or a tapeworm. But the sorts of places with which we are here concerned - particular forests, 
heaths, meadows, mudflats and so forth - do not have goods of their own. Maybe one could speak of 
certain conditions as harming certain places, as cadmium pollution might be said to harm mangroves. 
Yet cadmium harms mangroves in the sense that acid rain harms masonry. It could not harm a 
mangrove in anything like the way that being kicked could harm a dog or being potted in treacle could 
harm a spider plant (see Sandler 2007, p. 77). Pace Katz, Sorell and Midgley, particular places do not 
seem to be the sorts of things to which one could have direct moral duties. Premise 2 seems to be true. 
 
2 Duties and Values 
 
As we saw, Bernstein would endorse Premise 1. The following quotations indicate that he would not 
be alone in doing so: 
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By ‘intrinsic value’ we refer here to the value something has independent of its usefulness, 
that is, regardless of whether it is a means to (instrumental to) some other end… 
[A]nthropocentrists will only admit indirect (or non-intrinsic) wrongness in human-caused 
environmental devastation. (Brennan and Lo 2010, pp. 43, 45) 
 
While I think that Kant’s critics are right in rejecting his claim that we have no direct duties to 
animals, that they are just instruments for us to use in any way we see fit, I think that they 
move too quickly to the program of ethics by extension. (Evans 2005, p. 10)
4
 
 
For [anthropocentrists] humans can have no duties to rocks, rivers, or ecosystems… [T]he 
environment is the wrong kind of primary target for an ethic. It is a means, not an end in 
itself. (Holmes Rolston III, quoted in O’Neil 1997, p. 48) 
 
The first quotation suggests that to say that our duties to x are all indirect is to say that x can be of 
only ‘non-intrinsic’ (that is, instrumental) value, if it is of any value at all. The second implies that if, 
as Kant believes, one cannot have direct moral duties to any nonhuman animals, then any value such 
animals have must reflect their usefulness (or, presumably, potential usefulness) and nothing more. In 
the third quotation, Rolston expresses his commitment to the view that someone who denies that we 
could have any direct duties to rocks, rivers and ecosystems must regard these entities as either 
valuable merely as means or else entirely lacking in value. 
The common assumption, then, is that Premise 1 is true. Now we have already seen that 
Premise 2 seems to be true. If that impression were correct, and if Premise 1 were also true, then it 
would follow that particular places could only be of instrumental value, if they are of any value at all. 
And if that were the case, then the inherently instrumentalist ESF would, presumably, be an 
                                                 
4
 Incidentally, Evans’ statement seems to presuppose an inaccurate reading of Kant’s views on our 
moral relations with nonhuman animals. See further, O’Neill 1998, pp. 212-3 and Wood 1998, p. 191. 
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appropriate framework to use to try to account for all the various ways that such places could be of 
value to human beings. 
 
3 Non-instrumental Value 
 
But is Premise 1 true? One way to refute it would be to find an example of something to which it is 
not possible to have any direct moral duties but which nonetheless has non-instrumental value. 
However, before initiating a search, it may be useful to pause to consider what exactly it means for 
something to have non-instrumental value. 
It is sometimes supposed that something can be of non-instrumental value only if it is valued 
for its non-relational properties. For instance, although Rick O’Neil (1997, p. 46) states that by 
intrinsic value he means ‘noninstrumental value, the value a thing has in itself, as opposed to the value 
it has as a means to some good’, he also implies that when things have this sort of value they have it 
due to their ‘nonrelational properties’. Yet, as Christine Korsgaard has shown, such claims conflate 
two distinctions: (1) the distinction between the value something has in itself (which she calls intrinsic 
value) and the value it derives from some other source (extrinsic value); and (2) the distinction 
between the value something has as a means to an end and the value it has for other reasons (i.e., 
instrumental and non-instrumental value, respectively). Korsgaard points out that the value of a thing 
can be both extrinsic (i.e., relational) and non-instrumental (1983, pp. 169-173). 
 Furthermore, some writers assume that something can be of non-instrumental value only if it 
is valuable as an end in itself and not merely as a means to an end. For example, having suggested 
(rightly, as I shall argue) that some entities to which one could not have direct moral duties are 
nonetheless of non-instrumental value, O’Neil (1997) seems to proceed on the assumption that 
something can have this kind of value only if it is valuable as an end in itself. If, however, non-
instrumental value is taken to mean value that is not instrumental value, then it is clear that something 
can be of non-instrumental value even if it is not of value as an end in itself. Consider the distinction 
between instrumental value and constitutive value, for instance. Something has the former if it helps 
to bring about some end, where the relevant ‘bringing about’ must amount to some kind of causal 
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contribution.
5
 By contrast, something has constitutive value, not (or not just) because of its causal 
effects, but because it is part of something of value.
6
 Russ Shafer-Landau (2013, p. 255) gives the 
example of a particular brushstroke in a painting by Van Gogh. The brushstroke is not (or at least, not 
merely) valuable as a means to the end of the production of the painting. So it is not (or not merely) of 
instrumental value. Nor is it of value as an end in itself. Its value derives, instead, from the role it 
plays in ‘constituting’ something that is of value. It is of constitutive value. 
 
4 Fitzpatrick’s Case 
 
A brushstroke in a beautiful painting is just one example of something with non-instrumental (or more 
precisely, constitutive) value to which it is not possible to have any direct moral duties. Such 
examples indicate that Premise 1 is false. The argument sketched in Section 1 would seem, therefore, 
to be unsound. It does not provide a compelling reason to think that particular places can be of only 
instrumental value, if they are of any value at all.  
But are any places of non-instrumental value? William J. Fitzpatrick (2004, p. 321), for his 
part, argues that ‘a broad range of natural things and places have non-instrumental value by virtue of 
playing constitutive, and not merely instrumental, roles in the flourishing of human beings’. The 
point, he suggests, can be made by means of a comparison with friendship. Genuine friendship is not 
a human good merely because it tends to have certain welcome effects, such as the production of 
pleasure. Fitzpatrick maintains that it counts as a human good because it is, as Aristotle recognised, an 
essential constituent of human flourishing. And friends are of non-instrumental value since they are 
‘constituents of friendship’ (2004, p. 321). Now, Fitzpatrick continues, the same holds true of certain 
sorts of engagement with the natural world. Like friendship, some such engagement is an essential 
constituent of human flourishing: ‘engagement with at least some range of natural things and places 
                                                 
5
 Similar interpretations of what it means to have instrumental value are provided by Mark Greene 
(2007, p. 579), Joel Kupperman (2005, p. 660), Ian Carter (1999, p. 54) and Shelly Kagan (1998, p. 
287). 
6
 The distinction between instrumental and constitutive value is discussed in more detail by Jeremy 
Moss (2014, p. 39), Donald S. Maier (2012, pp. 15-16), Gerald Dworkin (1988, p. 80) and Donald H. 
Regan (1986, p. 203). 
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is… a core ingredient of human flourishing’ (2004, p. 329). And just as friends derive non-
instrumental value from being constituents of friendship, so ‘a broad range of natural things and 
places’ are of non-instrumental value because they are constituents of such engagement. 
Fitzpatrick’s argument turns on the claim that engagement with some natural things and 
places is an essential constituent of human flourishing. To try to justify that claim he appeals, first, to 
some passages from Ralph Waldo Emerson which attest to ‘aesthetic delights that run so deep that 
they come across as nothing less than fundamental goods for human beings… without which a human 
life would be significantly impoverished.’ (2004, p. 327) Second, he refers to our need to see ‘how we 
fit into a larger, magnificent order.’ (2004, p. 327) In neither case, he suggests, is there a ‘plausible 
substitute’ for engagement with the natural world (2004, p. 329). Fitzpatrick does not claim that either 
sort of engagement with nature is a sufficient condition for flourishing. But he does suggest that both 
are necessary. 
Fitzpatrick’s claims are implausible, however. Even if certain capacities for aesthetic 
appreciation are essential for human flourishing (which is not obvious) it is implausible to suppose 
that those capacities can be exercised only in relation to the sorts of things and places that so impress 
nature lovers such as Emerson. Likewise, even if human beings can flourish only if they have a sense 
of how they fit into some magnificent ordered whole, it would take a great deal of argument, and 
much more than Fitzpatrick provides, to show that that whole must be a ‘grand natural order’ (2004, 
p. 327; my emphasis). Fitzpatrick maintains that one ‘cannot fully grasp’ one’s sense of being part of 
some grand order ‘while milling about in a shopping mall, or sitting in the office’ (2004, p. 327). That 
isn’t obviously true; but even if it were true, it would not entail that one can appreciate one’s place in 
such an order only when one is in the midst of natural, rather than artefactual, things. Can a cathedral 
or a synagogue provide no sense of one’s place in the great scheme of things? 
Fitzpatrick therefore fails to establish that ‘engagement with at least some range of natural 
things and places is… a core ingredient of human flourishing’ (2004, p. 329). A woman who does her 
utmost to avoid green and growing things might participate in a number of other worthwhile 
activities. She may be a talented scientist or artist, or a great supporter of humanitarian causes; and if 
she is any of these things, it is not at all clear that her life must be judged to be lacking. Strange 
10 
 
though it may seem to those of us who enjoy hiking, birdwatching and reading papers on 
environmental ethics, it remains to be shown that engagement with nature is an essential part of 
human flourishing.
7
 
 
5 The Constitutive Value of Places 
 
Fitzpatrick does not manage to show that engagement with some ‘natural things and places’ is an 
essential constituent of human flourishing. But he is, I believe, right to suggest that some such things 
and places are of non-instrumental value because they are parts of valuable wholes. But what might 
those wholes be? 
 William Wordsworth’s poem ‘Michael’ provides a clue (cf. Malpas 1999, pp. 1-2). The 
individual named in the title is an old shepherd who, Wordsworth says, had lived ‘Upon the forest-
side of Grasmere Vale’ for over eighty years. It is clear that that the Vale is of great value to the 
shepherd. Wordsworth writes that 
 
… grossly that man errs, who would suppose 
That the green valleys, and the streams and rocks, 
Were things indifferent to the Shepherd’s thoughts. 
 
And he goes on to convey why the Vale is of value to him: 
 
Fields, where with cheerful spirits he had breathed 
The common air; hills, which with vigorous step 
He had so often climbed; which had impressed 
So many incidents upon his mind 
Of hardship, skill or courage, joy or fear; 
Which, like a book, preserved the memory 
                                                 
7
 For a detailed defence of this claim, see Attfield 2011, p. 36. 
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Of the dumb animals, whom he had saved,  
Had fed or sheltered, linking to such acts 
The certainty of honourable gain; 
Those fields, those hills—what could they less? had laid 
Strong hold on his affections, were to him 
A pleasurable feeling of blind love, 
The pleasure which there is in life itself. 
(Wordsworth 1963, pp. 221-222) 
 
It is not possible to have any direct moral duties to Grasmere Vale. The Vale can be neither benefited 
nor harmed; for all its beauty, it is in this respect more like a bicycle than a dog, for instance, or even 
a daffodil. Furthermore, Wordsworth does not suggest that Michael believes that it is possible to have 
any duties to the Vale. There is no evidence that the shepherd thinks that Grasmere Vale could be 
harmed or in any other manner wronged. Even so, it is clear that the place is of great value to him. It 
is also clear that the old shepherd values Grasmere Vale because it is the particular place it is. One 
imagines that Michael sees the hills surrounding Grasmere as the same hills that his parents knew, and 
their parents before them. This or that brook, this or that copse of trees, the sheep-fold higher up the 
hillside – these things remind the shepherd of events in his own life or of events that he has heard 
stories about. It is these particular features of this particular place which have ‘impressed so many 
incidents upon his mind’, which have ‘like a book’ preserved those memories. It is these hills which – 
as he might put it – tell the story of his family and community; these hills which are part of who he is. 
From Michael’s perspective, no other area of land would do. 
 Although Wordsworth himself was not able to achieve this sort of intimacy with the land, 
autobiographical works such as The Prelude make it clear that he derived part of his sense of identity 
from the crags, fells and glacial valleys of the Lake District. The connection between place and sense 
of identity is even more pronounced in the life and works of John Clare, a man who, as Jonathan Bate 
(2003, p. 363) puts it, derived his ‘profoundest sense of personal identity’ from the woods, heaths and 
fields around the village of his birth (cf. Rigby 2004, pp. 59-60). And it would be a mistake to 
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suppose that that kind of intimacy can be found only in the lives and works of nineteenth-century 
Romantics. The literature of anthropology, environmental psychology and cultural geography 
provides plenty of examples of people – and peoples – who derive part of their sense of identity from 
the particular places they inhabit. Thus in his acclaimed study Children of Crisis, Robert Coles relates 
the views of a tenant farmer who lives and works ‘in a broad valley at the foot of the hill country of 
Tennessee’. ‘[F]or us it’s a choice we have,’ says the farmer, ‘between going away or else staying 
here and not seeing much money at all, but working on the land, like we know how to do, living here, 
where you can feel you’re you, and no one else…’ (1971, pp. 15, 17-18) The anthropologist Mark 
Nuttall finds similar views prevailing amongst the people of Greenland. Each Greenlandic 
community, he writes, has ‘its own recognised territory, known as the piniarfik, or piniariartarfik 
(“the hunting place”).’ This, he explains, is ‘a personalised landscape, having significance for 
individual and family history’; as such, it is ‘a key component of a sense of identity’ (1998, p. 88). 
Miriam Kahn’s study of the people of Wamira, a small village in southeastern Papua New Guinea, 
provides another example. For the villagers, she writes, the surrounding landscape 
 
resounds… with narratives of collective history and personal experience. It provides tangible 
forms for the mooring of memory. What looks like a river, a hill, or a group of stones may, in 
fact, resonate meaningfully to Wamirans as a type of moral landscape conveying messages 
about human frailties, foibles, and responsibilities. Meaning attached to the landscape unfolds 
in language, names, stories, myths, and rituals. These meanings crystallize into shared 
symbols and ultimately link people to a sense of common history and individual identity.
8
 
 
A vast number of studies have addressed the relations between kinds of place and ways of life: 
between nomadic Bedouins and deserts, for instance, or Inuit peoples and polar regions. Yet examples 
                                                 
8
 Kahn 1996, pp. 167-8; cf. p. 178. Examples of this sort need to be regarded with a critical eye. 
Rootedness can, and often does, go hand in hand with small-mindedness and xenophobia. But it 
would be a very jaded commentator who concluded that all those people who enjoyed such intimacy 
with the places they inhabit are small-minded or xenophobic. In any case, suppose, for the sake of 
argument, that some of them are not. My concern here will be to assess the kind of value places can 
have for those sorts of people. 
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of the sort cited above indicate the relations between particular places and certain people or peoples. 
They suggest that particular places can supply people with certain sorts of benefit. Particular places, it 
would seem, can provide ‘tangible forms for the mooring of memory’ and ‘a sense of common 
history’. More generally, they can provide a context within which one’s own life and work has 
meaning, and they can help to shape one’s sense of who one is. 
 These claims are, I admit, vague. Much more would need to be said to give a clear account of 
what it might mean for a place to provide a context within which one’s own life and work has 
meaning, for instance. Still, despite their vagueness, they do give a general impression of the sorts of 
benefits people obtain from particular places in these kinds of cases. And that general impression will 
be enough for me to make the point I want to make. 
 That point concerns value. In the kinds of cases we are considering, particular places benefit, 
and so have value for, the people who live and work in them. What kind of value do they have? 
 Begin with the proposal that they have instrumental value. If x has instrumental value, if, that 
is, it is of value as a means to some end, then the relevant end can be specified without referring to x 
(see, e.g., Matravers 2013, p. 35). But on any plausible interpretation of the sorts of case we are 
considering, that is not possible. Take the example of Grasmere Vale. It could be of merely 
instrumental value for someone who wishes to invest in land. For the investor, the place is of value 
because it is a means to the end of his making money, and many other similarly priced tracts of land 
would do just as well. The case of Michael is, however, entirely different. Grasmere Vale is not of 
value merely as a means to the end of the shepherd continuing to live as he does, for that end could 
not be specified without referring to the Vale itself. That is to say, one could not provide anything 
approaching a satisfactory description of Michael’s life without referring to the particular vale in 
which he lives and works. So, is it rather the case that the Vale is of instrumental value because it is a 
means to the end of the shepherd continuing to have a certain sense of who he is?
9
 No, for it is not 
possible to describe Michael’s sense of who he is without referring to the place in which his sense of 
                                                 
9
 The claim that the Vale benefits Michael by constituting his identity raises a non-identity problem. 
For if Michael would not be who he is were it not for his relations to the Vale, then in what sense 
could he be better off on account of those relations? However, we are here considering the claim that 
the Vale benefits Michael by (partly) constituting his sense of identity. And that claim does not raise a 
non-identity problem. 
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identity was forged and in which it continues to be sustained. Granted, if the shepherd had always 
lived in some other place, then it is likely that that place would have come to be integral to his life and 
his sense of identity. However, as things stand, it is Grasmere Vale alone that has that distinction. For 
Michael, there are no alternative service providers. 
 In these sorts of case, the language of constitution is more appropriate than that of 
instrumentality. I take no stand on the specifics. One could say that Grasmere Vale partly constitutes 
Michael’s way of life, or his sense of who he is. However the point is expressed, it will be clear that 
the particular place benefits the shepherd, not (or not simply) by serving as an effective means to 
some valuable end, but by being part of some whole which is of value to him. As such, its value will 
be constitutive rather than instrumental. 
 
6 Why the Provision of a Sense of Place is not an Ecosystem Service  
 
It might seem, at first sight, that the ESF could provide an adequate account of such values. Certainly, 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment includes the provision of a ‘sense of place’ in its list of 
cultural ecosystem services. The Joint Nature Conservation Committee, the UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment and the Common International Classification of Ecosystem Services follow suit.
10
 The 
problem with these attempts to frame the provision of a sense of place as an ecosystem service is not 
just that they are too simplistic. It would not be enough to develop a more sophisticated account of the 
relevant services. The problem is that talk of services implies instrumentality (Reyers et al. 2012, p. 
504), and an instrumentalist conceptual framework is unable to capture what is in essence a 
constitutive relation. 
                                                 
10
  See (1) Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) Ecosystems and Well-being: A Framework for 
Assessment (Washington, DC: Island Press), p. 59; (2) 
http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/default.aspx?page=6382 (accessed 12 March 2015); (3) p. 4 of the Synthesis 
of the Key Findings of the UK National Ecosystem Assessment: it is ‘in our environment where we 
find recreation, health and solace, and in which our culture finds its roots and sense of place. 
Scientists refer to these services that our environment provides as “ecosystem services”…’ 
(http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org/Resources/tabid/82/Default.aspx - accessed 12 March 2015), and (4) 
Roy Haines-Young and Marion Potschin, Common International Classification of Ecosystem Services 
(CICES): 2011 Update (see page 6 of 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seeaLES/egm/Issue8a.pdf - accessed 12 March 2015). 
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The ESF is therefore unable to provide a satisfactory account of all the various ways that 
places can be of value to us. It works when places are of value because they serve as means to 
valuable ends. It is appropriate to conceive of water purification, for instance, or carbon sequestration 
as valuable ecosystem services. But the ESF cannot provide an adequate account of those cases when 
places are of value to people because they are integral to their lives. 
 
7 The Charge of Romanticism 
 
The following objection may be raised to the argument sketched above: 
 
The case for the constitutive value of places rests on a discredited conception of the relations 
between people and places. It presupposes that those people who continue to live in more 
traditional ways are rooted in the places they inhabit. Such people are assumed to dwell in 
certain essentially timeless places, their forms of life and senses of identity as fixed as their 
unchanging surroundings. 
 Yet that singularly Romantic conception is no longer compelling. Social scientists 
such as Michael Keith, Steve Pile and Doreen Massey have shown that it fails to do justice to 
the fluidity of the relations between people and the places they inhabit. Consider sense of 
identity. A person’s sense of identity, or indeed that of a people, is always in the process of 
being constructed. It is true that in order to make sense of a particular case, this process can 
be ‘stopped to reveal an identity that is akin to a freeze-frame photograph of a racehorse at 
full gallop.’ (Keith and Pile 1993, p. 28; cf. Massey 2005, p. 141) But that ‘act of freezing’ 
obscures the fact that the construction of a sense of identity is ‘always an incomplete process.’ 
(Keith and Pile 1993, p. 28) And what holds true of a person’s sense of identity also applies to 
the places they inhabit. Writing of Skiddaw, a large hill twenty miles or so north of Michael’s 
Vale, Massey (2005, p. 140) maintains that what is special about the place is ‘not some 
romance of pre-given collective identity or of the eternity of the hills’, for ‘the hills are rising, 
the landscape is being eroded and deposited; the climate is shifting; the very rocks themselves 
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continue to move on.’ (2005, p. 140-1) There is no ‘barely changing rootedness’ here, only 
the ‘event of place’, ‘a constellation of processes rather than a thing.’ (2005, p. 154, 141) 
 
Suppose, for argument’s sake, that writers such as Massey and Pile are correct. That would give us 
reason to rethink the relations between people and the places they inhabit. Perhaps, as Massey (2005, 
p. 183) suggests, it should impel us to reassess Heidegger’s notion of place, for instance. But it would 
not undermine the argument presented in this paper. For one can consistently hold that a particular 
place is of constitutive value to a person because it is partly constitutive of her form of life while 
accepting that neither the place nor the form of life is static, but that each continually shapes and 
reshapes the other through what Massey (risking the pathetic fallacy) calls a process of ‘negotiation’ 
(cf. Harvey 1996, p. 307-8). 
 
8 Services, Values and Justice 
 
There are two reasons why such values ought to be taken seriously by environmental policymakers. 
First, in many of those cases when a place has constitutive value for a person, it will be of very great 
value to that person.
11
 Again, an admittedly Romantic example serves to put the issue in sharp relief. 
So consider, one more time, the example of Michael. It is not simply that Michael has a strong 
preference for ‘the forest-side of Grasmere Vale’ over other spatial locations, as he might have a 
preference for, say, milk rather than water in his porridge. The poem implies that the Vale has value 
for him in something like the way that his own life has value for him. Perhaps, if he hated himself, 
then he would also hate the Vale which, in his view, had helped to make him the man he is. But there 
is no evidence that Michael feels that way. Wordsworth’s poem suggests, rather, that the place’s value 
is presupposed in everything the old shepherd says and does. As such, it is likely to be for the most 
part invisible to him. (Perhaps it manifests itself as the ‘pleasurable feeling of blind love’ which ‘there 
                                                 
11
 But not perhaps in all such cases. A particular place could conceivably be of constitutive value to a 
person even if she regards it as hostile or repellent. Think of the way in which the way of life of 
people on a frontier can be shaped through their efforts to subdue the surrounding, ever-encroaching 
wilderness. 
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is in life itself’.) Maybe, indeed, he would only come fully to realise the value of the Vale were he 
forced to leave it.
12
 Nevertheless, the place would seem to be of considerable value to him.
13
  And the 
same may be said of the value of their piniarfik to a group of Greenlanders or the value of the rivers 
and hills surrounding Wamira for the Wamirans. More generally, then, places that are of constitutive 
value for people are often of considerable value for those people. It is therefore important that their 
value is properly accounted for in the evaluative methods employed by those in environmental 
organisations such as the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) or the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). 
A second reason for taking the constitutive value of places seriously is as follows. In today’s 
globalising world, many of those people (and peoples) for whom particular places have constitutive 
value are likely to be in various respects marginalised. Think of the Arctic indigenous peoples of 
whom Nuttall writes, or of Coles’s tenant farmers, or even of modern-day hill farmers in the Lake 
District.
14
 If, therefore, the members of environmental organisations such as UNEP or the EPA are to 
avoid further marginalising people who are already marginalised, then they will need to use methods 
that are sensitive to the kinds of value such people find in the places they inhabit. The issue is 
essentially one of procedural justice. Thomas Sikor et al. (2013, p. 199) maintain that the ecosystem 
services framework ‘closes down possibilities for justice’ since it tends to ‘marginalise people by 
denying the recognition of their ways of knowing, conceptions of value and notions of governance.’15 
Though more work would be needed to prove the point, I would suggest that Sikor et al. are at least 
partly right. To use the ecosystem services framework is to risk marginalising some of those already 
marginalised people for whom places are of constitutive, and not merely instrumental, value. 
 
                                                 
12
 On the psychological effects of displacement, see Fullilove 1996. 
13
 A remark from Coles’s interviewee is relevant here. In the course of explaining how it is only in the 
place he lives that he feels truly himself, he considers the objection that, given his straitened 
circumstances, that might not be a cause for celebration. His words call to mind Nietzsche’s notion of 
the eternal recurrence: ‘[A]lthough I can’t say I’m a happy man here… if I had to choose… I don’t 
think I’d know what to do but tell the Lord that I’ll take this one, this life, all over again, with the pain 
and all.’ (1971, pp. 16-17) 
14
 On the marginalisation of Cumbrian hill farmers, see Mansfield 2008. 
15
 Ernstson and Sörlin 2013 arrive at a similar conclusion. For a very different assessment of the 
ESF’s potential for helping marginalised peoples, see Ramirez-Gomez et al. 2015. 
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9 Conclusions 
 
Particular places cannot have goods of their own; consequently, it is not possible to have direct moral 
duties to them. Nonetheless, contrary to what is often supposed, something to which one could not 
have any direct moral duties need not be of merely instrumental value, if it is of any value at all. 
Indeed, particular places can have a certain kind of non-instrumental value – namely, constitutive 
value – when they are integral to people’s lives. This sort of value cannot be adequately conceived in 
terms of the service-based conceptual framework that environmental decision makers typically use to 
evaluate places. To accommodate such cases, decision makers must therefore look beyond the ESF – 
perhaps to one of the forms of multicriteria decision analysis that seem increasingly to be winning 
support in the environmental sector.
16
 There is, however, no space to consider these alternative 
options here. In this paper, I have merely tried to point out the limits of the ESF. If I am right, those 
limits are considerable. 
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